We analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium of the round-robin tournament with one strong (dominant) and two weak players, and compare between this tournament and the one-stage contest with respect to the players' expected payo¤s, expected total e¤ort and their probabilities to win. We …nd that if the designer's goal is to maximize the dominant player's probability to win then he should use the round-robin tournament given that the weak players are matched in the second stage. If, however, the allocation of players is randomly determined then the contest designer might prefer the one-stage contest. Last, if the contest designer's goal is to maximize the players' expected total e¤ort, then if the asymmetry between the players is relatively low he should use the one-stage contest, but, if the asymmetry is relatively high the round-robin tournament should be used.
Introduction
Tournaments are prevalent in many areas of life including labor markets (Lazear and Rosen 1981 In this paper we focus on the round-robin tournaments in which every player or team competes against all the others, and in every stage a player plays a pair-wise match against a di¤erent opponent. Such particular tournaments commonly take place in professional football and basketball leagues but sometimes can be seen in other domains. To illustrate, in the 2015 elections for Israel's Knesset a representative of each party was invited for a TV debate which was organized as a round-robin tournament where in each stage the parties'representatives were divided into di¤erent pairs, with each pair confronting each other for several minutes.
In the literature on contests, the most common goal, especially in sport contests, is to maximize the players' total e¤ort (Szymanski 2003) . However, the contest designer may also want to increase the competitive balance by decreasing the di¤erences among the players'probabilities of winning, or, alternatively, he may want to a¤ect the identity of the winner by determining the players'probabilities of winning (Groh et al. 2012 ). This can be done by choosing the type of tournament. We address these issues by comparing between the round-robin tournament and the standard one-stage contest in which all the players compete against each other only once in one grand contest. The comparison is done with respect to the players' expected payo¤s, their probabilities of winning, and their expected total e¤ort. It is important to note that when the players are asymmetric the results of the round-robin tournament depend on the allocations of players in the di¤erent stages of the tournament. Thus, since the number of di¤erent allocations grows exponentially in the number of players, we focus on the simple case of three players where one is dominant, i.e., one player has a higher value of winning than the other (weaker) players. 1 Over the years this format of round-robin tournaments with three players has been used in many Olympic Games tournaments such as wrestling, badminton, women's soccer, etc. It was also used in several geographical zones of the FIFA World Cup quali…cations. In our round-robin tournament there are three possible allocations of the players, 1 We believe that some of our main results hold for round-robin tournaments with any number of players.
all of which are considered in this paper. For both types of contests, each match is modeled as an all-pay contest. 2 In the all-pay contest (auction) the contestant with the highest e¤ort (output) wins the contest, but all the contestants bear the cost of their e¤ort. 3 We …nd that, independent of the allocation of players, the expected payo¤s of the weak players in the round-robin tournament is higher than or equal to their expected payo¤s in the one-stage contest. In contrast, depending on the players' allocation in the round-robin tournament, the expected payo¤ of the dominant player in the one-stage contest can be either higher or lower than in the round-robin tournament.
Furthermore, if the dominant player is allocated in the …rst and the last stages of the round-robin tournament his expected payo¤ in the round-robin tournament is higher than in the one-stage contest. The intuitive explanation for this is that if the dominant player wins in the …rst stage his expected value of winning increases and his opponents' expected values of winning decreases in the following stages. In addition, by playing in the last stage the dominant player might compete against an opponent that lost in the previous stages and therefore has a low chance to win the tournament. This situation enables the dominant player to win in the last stage and particularly to win the entire tournament without exerting much e¤ort. Therefore, allocation in the …rst and last stages is favorable for the dominant player and in that case he prefers the round-robin tournament over the one-stage contest.
However, usually, a player cannot choose the stages in which he is allocated and actually the allocation of players in the round-robin tournament is randomly determined, namely, each possible allocation of players is chosen by the same probability. In that case, the dominant player's expected payo¤ in the round-robin tournament will be higher than in the one-stage contest given that the asymmetry between the players is relatively low and vice versa if the asymmetry is high. Thus, while the weak players prefer the round-robin tournament, the dominant player does not necessarily prefer either of the contests.
Using this analysis of the subgame perfect equilibrium, we then calculate the dominant player's probability 2 Numerous applications of the all-pay contest have been made to rent-seeking and lobbying in organizations, R&D races, political contests, promotions in labor markets, trade wars, military and biological wars of attrition (see, for example, Che and Gale (1998) and Moldovanu and Sela (2001) ). 3 The all-pay contest is the limit point of the popular Tullock contest with the success function p i (x 1 ; x 2 ) = (x i ) r (x 1 ) y +(x 2 ) r ; i = 1; 2 when r converges to in…nity. Thus, we can conjecture that our results hold for the Tullock success function when r is su¢ ciently large.
to win in the round-robin tournament and then show by numerical analysis that, independent of the level of asymmetry, the dominant player's probability to win is highest when the weak players are matched in the second stage. The reason again is, if the dominant player wins in the …rst stage he dramatically increases the di¤erence in his expected value of winning and his opponents'values of winning in the next stages and accordingly he increases his probability to win his next game. On the other hand, if the dominant player does not play in the …rst stage he might play against a weak player who already won in the previous stage and therefore will have an expected value that is higher than his own, i.e., the dominant player will no longer be dominant. Thus, if a contest designer wishes to maximize the dominant player's probability to win, he should organize a round-robin tournament and allocate the dominant player in the …rst and last stages. However, if the players are randomly allocated in the round-robin tournament, independent of the asymmetry of the players, the dominant player's probability to win in the one-stage contest is higher than in the round-robin tournament when the players are randomly allocated. These …ndings indicate that the common intuition according to which the dominant player's probability to win is always higher in the round-robin tournament than in the one-stage contest is not correct.
We also calculate the players'expected total e¤ort and compare it between the round-robin tournament and the one-stage contest. Our results show that for every allocation of players in the round-robin tournament, in particular when the allocation is randomly determined, if the asymmetry is relatively low, the expected total e¤ort is higher in the one-stage contest, while if the asymmetry is relatively high, then the expected total e¤ort is higher in the round-robin tournament. The reason for these results is that when the asymmetry between the players is relatively high by allocating the weak players in the …rst stage, the designer gives them advantage as we explained above, the tournament becomes more balanced and then the players exert more e¤ort than in the one-stage contest. Hence, if the contest designer wishes to maximize the players' expected total e¤ort whether he chooses the round-robin tournament or the one-stage contest will depend on the asymmetry between the players.
It should be mentioned that, independent of the level of asymmetry, the expected total e¤ort is minimized when the two weak players are matched in the second stage of the round-robin tournament while the dominant player's probability to win is maximized when the two weak players are matched in the second stage of the round-robin tournament. Thus, a contest designer will not be able to maximize the expected total e¤ort together with the dominant player's probability of winning the tournament. The reason for these …ndings is very simple since, again, the more balanced the contest is the higher will be the players' expected total e¤ort.
We focus on the comparison between the round-robin tournament and the one-stage contest, but it is important to emphasize that the analysis of the one-stage contest with two weak players and one dominant player is strategically equivalent to an elimination tournament in which the two weak players usually compete in the semi…nal and the winner competes against the dominant player in the …nal. In the elimination tournament the expected total e¤ort in the semi…nal approaches zero and each of the weak players plays in the …nal with the same probability. Thus, our comparison between the one-stage contest and the roundrobin tournament is equivalent to the comparison between the elimination tournament and the round-robin tournament. Similarly to Groh et al. (2012) who studied optimal seeding in elimination tournaments, in our round-robin model we assume that the winning probabilities in each match are endogenous in that they result from mixed equilibrium strategies and are positively correlated to winning valuations. Furthermore, Our paper is related to several other works that focus on the importance of the …rst and the last stages in multi-stage contests. For example, Klumpp and Polborn (2006) showed that in sequential elections between two candidates, the loser of the …rst district will have a lower incentive to exert a costly e¤ort in the second district than the winner of the …rst district. This yields an increased probability of the winner of the …rst district to win again in the second district. Deck and Sheremeta (2012) showed that if a defender wins early battles in the game of siege, the attacker becomes discouraged and as a result the probability for him to win any future battles decreases. Page and Page (2007) found empirically that in the best-of-two European soccer cup competitions, the second leg home team has more than a 50% probability to win. Krumer (2013) 4 The statistical literature on the design of various forms of tournaments (see, David (1959) , Glenn (1960) and Searles (1963)) assumes that for each match among players i and j there is a …xed, exogenously given probability that i beats j: Thus, in contrast to Groh et al. (2012) , this probability does not depend on the stage of the tournament where the particular match takes place nor on the identity of the expected opponent at the next stage.
explained this …nding by revealing a possible psychological advantage to the winner of the …rst stage.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the equilibrium analysis of the one-stage contest. Section 3 presents the subgame perfect equilibrium in the three possible allocations of players in the round-robin tournament with a dominant player and two weak players. In Section 4 we analyze the players' expected payo¤s in the round-robin tournament and compare them to those in the one-stage contest. In
Sections 5 and 6 we compare the dominant player's probability of winning and the players'expected total e¤ort between the one-stage contest and the round-robin tournament. Appendixes A, B and C include a complete analysis of the subgame perfect equilibrium for the di¤erent allocations of players in the roundrobin tournament. Appendix D (an online appendix) calculates the dominant player's probability of winning and the players'expected total e¤ort in the round-robin tournament.
The one-stage (all-pay) contest
We begin with the analysis of the standard one-stage (all-pay) contest which will serve as a benchmark According to Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1996) , there is always a mixedstrategy equilibrium in which players 3 and 2 (or alternatively, players 3 and 1) randomize on the interval [0; 1] according to their e¤ort cumulative distribution functions which are given by
We can see that the expected payo¤ of player 2 (and player 1) is zero, while player 3's is v 1: Player 3's e¤ort is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function
while player 2's (or 1's) e¤ort is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function
Given these mixed strategies, player 3's winning probability against player 2 (or player 1) is
If we assume that players 1 and 2 have the same probability to be the opponent who plays against player 3, then each of them has the following probability of winning the contest
The players'expected total e¤ort is given by
Alternatively, consider the situation in which these three players compete in an elimination tournament where the two weak players (1 and 2) simultaneously compete in the semi…nal (…rst stage) and the winner competes in the …nal (second stage) against the dominant player (player 3). 5 Then the winner of the …nal wins the tournament and obtains the prize. In the subgame perfect equilibrium of this elimination tournament, players 1 and 2 do not exert any e¤ort in the …rst stage, and each of them plays against player 3 in the second stage with the same probability. Hence, we can see that the elimination tournament with two weak players and one dominant player is exactly equivalent to the one-stage contest. Using the above analysis of the one-stage (all-pay) contest we can now turn to analyze the players'equilibrium strategies in the round-robin tournament and, in particular, to compare the players'performances in both contest types.
3 The round-robin (all-pay) tournament
Consider three players (or teams) i = 1; 2; 3 competing for a single prize. We assume that there are two weak players (players 1 and 2) who have the same value of winning v 1 = v 2 = 1 and a dominant player 
The players'expected payo¤s
In this section we …rst investigate the e¤ect of the allocation of players in the round-robin tournament on the players'expected payo¤s. Then we compare the …ndings to that of the one-stage contest.
Proposition 1 In the round-robin tournament with one dominant player and two weak players, if the weak players are matched in the …rst or the third stage and the asymmetry between the players is relatively weak, the expected payo¤ of the dominant player is lower than the expected payo¤ s of the weak players. However, if the weak players are matched in the second stage, then independent of whether the asymmetry is weak or strong, the expected payo¤ of the dominant player is always higher than the expected payo¤ s of the weak players.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix D (online appendix).
According to Proposition 1, if the dominant player can choose the players'allocation in the round-robin tournament he would allocate his two weak opponents in the second stage such that he will compete against one of them in the …rst stage and against the other in the last stage. The intuition behind this result is as follows: If the weak players are allocated in the …rst stage then the dominant player competes against the winner in the …rst stage with a relatively high probability. In that case, he might have a lower chance to win against his opponent in the second stage since he might have a lower expected value of winning than his opponent who needs only to win one more time in order to win the entire tournament. Thus, the dominant player might no longer be dominant and therefore such an allocation is not pro…table for him. If, on the other hand, the weak players are matched in the third stage, the dominant player competes against each of his opponents in the …rst two stages in which each of them still has a real chance to win the tournament.
Then, the weak players exert relatively high e¤orts in the …rst two stages and the dominant player will exert an even higher e¤ort if he wants to win. Consequently, the dominant player's expected payo¤ is relatively low when the weak players are matched in the third stage. However, if the weak players are matched in the second stage, i.e., the dominant player plays in the …rst and the third stages, the dominant player has a relatively high chance to win in the …rst stage. Moreover, the dominant player also has a chance to compete against his opponent in the last stage when this opponent lost in his previous game. This situation enables the dominant player to win in the last stage and even win the entire tournament without exerting much e¤ort. By comparing each player's expected payo¤ in the one-stage contest given by (1) with that of the round-robin tournament given in Appendix D, we obtain that Proposition 2 In a competition between one dominant and two weak players, the expected payo¤ of the weak players in the round-robin tournament is higher than or equal to their expected payo¤ s in the one-stage contest. On the other hand, depending on the players'allocation, the expected payo¤ of the dominant player could be either higher or lower than in the one-stage contest. If the allocation of the players in the round-robin tournament is random, namely, each allocation of players is chosen with the same probability, then the dominant player's expected payo¤ in the round-robin tournament is higher than in the one-stage contest when the asymmetry between the players is relatively low and vice versa if the asymmetry is high.
Intuitively, multi-stage contests like the round-robin tournament yield a higher expected payo¤ for the dominant player than a one-stage contest since in the round-robin tournament the dominant player can make up for an unexpected loss in one of the stages and still win the entire tournament. However, according to Proposition 2, the round-robin tournament does not necessarily yield a higher expected payo¤ for the dominant player than the one-stage contest, but rather is more pro…table for the dominant player only if the weak players are matched in the second stage. If, on the other hand, the allocation of players is randomly determined, then, depending on whether the asymmetry is low or high, the dominant player's expected payo¤ might be either higher or lower than in the one-stage contest. The reason is that when the asymmetry among the players is high, by choosing an allocation of players in which the dominant player is not allocated in the …rst and third stages, the designer can reduce the advantage of the dominant player while in the one-stage contest this advantage remains the same.
The dominant player' s winning probability
In this section we examine how the contest designer can maximize the dominant player's probability of winning by choosing an appropriate allocation of players. In the one-stage contest, the dominant player's probability to win is given by (2) . Using the equilibrium analysis in Appendices A, B and C, we explicitly calculate in Appendix D the dominant player's probability of winning in the round-robin tournament for all three possible allocations of players. Then by numerical analysis we show in Figure 4 the dominant player's probability to win as a function of the level of asymmetry in both contest forms [ Figure 4 about here].
We can see that, independent of the level of asymmetry, the dominant player's probability to win is highest in the round-robin tournament when the weak players are matched in the second stage. The intuition, as we already explained, is very simple. When the dominant player competes in the last stage he always has a chance to win especially if he competes against a weak player who lost in the previous stage. Furthermore, if the dominant player does not play in the …rst stage he might compete against a weak player who actually has a higher expected value of winning since he needs only one more win to be the winner of the tournament while the dominant player needs to win in the following two stages. Thus, if a contest designer wishes to maximize the dominant player's probability to win, he should organize a round-robin tournament and allocate the weak players in the second stage. However, the dominant player's probability to win is always higher in the one-stage contest than in the round-robin tournament when the weak players are not matched in the second stage. In that case, if the asymmetry is relatively low, i.e., v < 1:03, the dominant player's probability to win is lowest in the round-robin tournament when the weak players are matched in the …rst stage, but if the asymmetry is relatively high, i.e., v > 1:03, the dominant player's probability to win is lowest in the round-robin tournament when the weak players are matched in the third stage. As we claimed previously, these …ndings indicate that the standard intuition according to which the dominant player's probability to win is higher in the round-robin tournament than in the one-stage contest is not completely correct.
Figure 4 also indicates that, independent of the asymmetry of the players, the dominant player's probability to win is higher in the one-stage contest than in the round-robin tournament when the players are randomly allocated, i.e., each allocation of players is chosen with the same probability of 1/3. Hence, in such a case, if the goal is to maximize the dominant player's probability to win the tournament, the contest designer should choose a one-stage contest instead of the round-robin tournament.
The players'total e¤ort
One of the possible goals of a contest designer is to maximize the expected total e¤ort. In the round-robin tournament the designer can a¤ect the players'expected e¤ort by choosing the allocation of players. Using the equilibrium analysis in Appendices A, B and C, we explicitly calculate in Appendix D the expected total e¤ort in the round-robin tournament and compare it to the expected total e¤ort in the one-stage contest (given by (4)). Then, we show by numerical analysis in Figure 5 the expected total e¤ort as a function of the level of asymmetry in the round-robin tournament as well as in the one-stage contest [ Figure 5 about here]. We can see that in the round-robin tournament, if the asymmetry is relatively low, i.e., v < 1:38 the expected total e¤ort is maximized when the two weak players (players 1 and 2) are matched in the …rst stage, but if the asymmetry is relatively high, i.e., v > 1:38 the expected total e¤ort is maximized when the two weak players are matched in the third stage. In addition, if the asymmetry is relatively low, i.e., v < 1:1 the expected total e¤ort is higher in the one-stage contest while if the asymmetry is relatively high, i.e., v > 1:1 the expected total e¤ort is higher in the round-robin tournament. Moreover, independent of the level of asymmetry, the expected total e¤ort for both contest forms is minimized when the two weak players are matched in the second stage of the round-robin tournament. The intuition for this last result is very simple since, as we showed in the previous section, when the two weak players are matched in the second stage the dominant player's probability to win is maximized. Then the competition between the dominant player and the weak players is not balanced and it is well known that when a contest is less balanced the expected e¤ort of the players is lower (see, for example, Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1996) and Konrad (2008)). Thus, for the round-robin tournament, if a contest designer wishes to maximize the expected total e¤ort he should not allocate the weak players in the second stage.
It is important to emphasize that for every allocation of the players in the round-robin tournament, if the asymmetry is relatively low, the expected total e¤ort is higher in the one-stage contest, while if the asymmetry is relatively high, the expected total e¤ort is higher in the round-robin tournament. Thus, this relation between the one-stage contest and the round-robin tournament regarding the players'expected total e¤ort holds even when the allocation of players in the round-robin tournament is randomly determined.
Concluding remarks
We studied round-robin tournaments with three players where one player is dominant, i.e., he has a higher value of winning than his weaker opponents. We demonstrated that the expected payo¤ of the weak players in the round-robin tournament is higher than or equal to their expected payo¤s in the one-stage contest, but the expected payo¤ of the dominant player in the one-stage contest could be either higher or lower than in the round-robin tournament. We also showed that if a contest designer wishes to maximize the dominant player's probability to win and he can determine the allocation of players, then he should organize a round-robin tournament. But, if the allocation of players in the round-robin tournament is random, he should organize a one-stage contest. In addition, if the contest designer wishes to maximize the players' expected total e¤ort, then if the asymmetry between the players is relatively low, the one-stage contest is preferred, while if the asymmetry is relatively high, the round-robin tournament should be chosen. It would be interesting to extend the analysis to more than three asymmetric players. However, such an extension is not simple due to the complex combinatorial structure of the round-robin tournament. We denote by p i;j the probability that player i wins against player j in node * of the tree-game.
We have the following three scenarios:
1) Assume …rst that player 2 won the game in the …rst stage and player 3 won in the second stage (node A in Figure 1 ). Since each of these players (2 and 3) won once before the last stage, the winner of the game between them in the third stage wins the entire tournament. In that case player 2's payo¤ would be 1, and player 3's payo¤ would be v. The loser's payo¤ in that stage will be zero. Thus, in the unique mixed strategy equilibrium the players randomize on the interval [0; 1] according to their e¤ort cumulative distribution functions F 3 i ; i = 2; 3 which are given by
Then, player 2's winning probability against player 3 in the third stage (node A) is given by
and the expected total e¤ort in the third stage (node A) is given by
2) Assume now that player 2 won the game in the …rst stage and player 3 lost the game in the second stage (node B in Figure 1 ). Thus, if player 2 also wins in the third stage he wins the tournament. In that case, his payo¤ is 1, whereas player 3's payo¤ is zero. But, if player 3 wins in this stage, then every player wins once and a draw will determine the winner of the entire tournament. Then, players 1 and 2's payo¤ is equal to In this case we have to consider two di¤erent subcases of asymmetry, i.e. 1 < v 2 and v > 2. If Figure 1 ), there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium in which players 2 and 3 randomize on the interval [0; 
Then, player 2's winning probability against player 3 in the third stage (node B1 in Figure 1 ) is given
and the expected total e¤ort in the third stage (node B1 in Figure 1 ) is given by
If, however, v > 2 (node B2 in Figure 1 ), there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium in which players 2 and 3 randomize on the interval [0; which are given by
Then, player 2's winning probability against player 3 in the third stage (node B2 in Figure 1 ) is given by
and the expected total e¤ort in the third stage (node B2 in Figure 1 ) is given by
3) We now assume that player 2 lost in the …rst stage and player 3 won in the second stage (node C in 
Then, player 2's winning probability against player 3 in the third stage (node C in Figure 1 ) is given by
and the expected total e¤ort in the third stage (node C in Figure 1 ) is given by
Stage 2 (player 1 vs. player 3)
We have two possible scenarios:
1) Assume that player 1 lost in the …rst stage (node D in Figure 1 ). In that case, if player 1 wins in the second stage and player 3 wins in the third stage, then player 1's expected payo¤ is 
Then, player 1's winning probability against player 3 in the second stage (node D1 in Figure 1 ) is given by
and the expected total e¤ort in the second stage (node D1 in Figure 1 ) is given by
Now, assume that 1:09 < v 2 (node D2 in Figure 1 ). Then, as previously, by (5), (8) and (9), there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium in which players 1 and 3 randomize on the interval [0; 
Then, player 1's winning probability against player 3 in the second stage (node D2 in Figure 1 ) is given by
and the expected total e¤ort in the second stage (node D2 in Figure 1 ) is given by
Finally, assume that v > 2 (node D3 in Figure 1 ). In that case, as previously, if 
Then, player 1's winning probability against player 3 in the second stage (node D3 in Figure 1 ) is given by
and the expected total e¤ort in the second stage (node D3 in Figure 1 ) is given by
2) Assume now that player 1 won in the …rst stage (node E in Figure 1 ). Figure 1) . Then, by (14) , (15), there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium in which players 1 and 3 randomize on the interval [0; 
Then, player 1's winning probability against player 3 in the second stage (node E1 in Figure 1 ) is given by
and the expected total e¤ort in the second stage (node E1 in Figure 1 ) is given by
If, however, v > 1:267 (node E2 in Figure 1 ), then, as previously, by (14) , (15) , there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium in which players 1 and 3 randomize on the interval [0; 
Then, player 1's winning probability against player 3 in the second stage (node E2 in Figure 1 ) is given by
and the expected total e¤ort in the second stage (node E2 in Figure 1 ) is given by
If 1 < v 1:09 (node F1 in Figure 1 ), by (5), (8) , (14), (17), (18) 
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Then, player 1's winning probability against player 2 in the …rst stage (node F1 in Figure 1 ) is given by
and the expected total e¤ort in the …rst stage (node F1 in Figure 1 ) is given by 
Then, player 1's winning probability against player 2 in the …rst stage (node F2 in Figure 1 ) is given by
and the expected total e¤ort in the …rst stage (node F2 in Figure 1 ) is given by Figure 1 ), by (5), (8), (14), (20) , (21), (29) and (30), there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium in which players 1 and 2 randomize on the interval [0; 
Then, player 1's winning probability against player 2 in the …rst stage (node F3 in Figure 1 ) is given by
and the expected total e¤ort in the …rst stage (node F3 in Figure 1 ) is given by
Similarly, if 1:596 < v 2 (node F4 in Figure 1 ), by (5), (8), (14), (20), (21), (29) and (30), there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium in which players 1 and 2 randomize on the interval [0;
72v 72 ] according to their e¤ort cumulative distribution functions F 1 i ; i = 1; 2 which are given by
Then, player 1's winning probability against player 2 in the …rst stage (node F4 in Figure 1 ) is given by
and the expected total e¤ort in the …rst stage (node F4 in Figure 1 ) is given by
Finally, if v > 2 (node F5 in Figure 1 ), by (5), (11), (14), (23), (24), (29) 
Then, player 1's winning probability against player 2 in the …rst stage (node F5 in Figure 1 ) is given by
And, the expected total e¤ort in the …rst stage (node F5 in Figure 1 ) is given by 
Stage 3 (player 2 vs. player 3)
1) Assume …rst that player 3 won the game in the …rst stage and player 2 won the game in the second stage (node A in Figure 2 ). Therefore, each player wins once before the last stage such that the winner of the third stage wins the entire tournament. In that case player 2's payo¤ is 1, and player 3's is v. The loser's payo¤ in that stage is zero. In the unique mixed strategy equilibrium, players 2 and 3 randomize on the interval [0; 1] according to their e¤ort cumulative distribution functions F 3 i ; i = 2; 3 which are given by
Then, player 2's winning probability against player 3 in the third stage (node A in Figure 2 ) is given by
and the expected total e¤ort in the third stage (node A in Figure 2 ) is given by
2) Assume now that player 3 won the game in the …rst stage and player 2 lost the game in the second stage (node B in Figure 2 ). Thus, if player 3 wins in the third stage, he wins the entire tournament. Then his payo¤ is v, whereas player 2's payo¤ is zero. But if player 2 wins in this stage, then every player wins once and a draw will determine the winner of the tournament. Then, players 1 and 2's payo¤ is equal to 1 3 and player 3's is 
Then, player 2's winning probability against player 3 in the third stage (node B in Figure 2 ) is given by
and the expected total e¤ort in the third stage (node B in Figure 2 ) is given by
3) Assume now that player 3 lost the game in the …rst stage and player 2 won the game in the second stage (node C in Figure 2 ). Thus, if player 2 also wins in the third stage he wins the entire tournament.
Then, his payo¤ is 1, whereas player 3's payo¤ is zero. But if player 3 wins in this stage, then every player wins once and a draw will determine the winner of the tournament. Then, players 1 and 2's payo¤ is equal to 
Then, player 2's winning probability against player 3 in the third stage (node C1 in Figure 2 ) is given by
and the expected total e¤ort in the third stage (node C1 in Figure 2 ) is given by
If, however, v > 2 (node C2 in Figure 2 ), there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium in which players 2 and 3 randomize on the interval [0; which are given by
Then, player 2's winning probability against player 3 in the third stage (node C2 in Figure 2 ) is given by
and the expected total e¤ort in the third stage (node C2 in Figure 2 ) is given by
Stage 2 (player 1 vs. player 2)
We have here two possible scenarios:
1) Assume that player 1 lost in the …rst stage (node D in Figure 2 ). Then by (47), even if player 2 wins in the second stage, his expected payo¤ in the next stage is zero. Therefore he has no incentive to exert a positive e¤ort and we actually do not have an equilibrium. However, as we already mentioned, in order to solve this problem, we can assume that each player obtains a payment of k > 0, if he wins a single game.
Then we consider the limit behavior as k ! 0. This assumption does not a¤ect the players'behavior, but ensures that equilibrium exists. Then, player 1's winning probability against player 2 in the second stage (node D in Figure 2 ) is given by
and the expected total e¤ort in the second stage (node D in Figure 2 ) is given by which are given by
Then, player 1's winning probability against player 2 in the second stage (node E1 in Figure 2 ) is given by
and the expected total e¤ort in the second stage (node E1 in Figure 2 ) is given by
If, however, v > 2 (node E2 in Figure 2 ), then by (56), if player 2 wins in the second stage, his expected payo¤ in the next stage is 
Then, player 1's winning probability against player 2 in the second stage (node E2 in Figure 2 ) is given by
and the expected total e¤ort in the second stage (node E2 in Figure 2 ) is given by Figure 2 ), by (50), (53), (59), (61) and (62), there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium in which players 1 and 3 randomize on the interval [0;
12v ] according to their e¤ort cumulative distribution functions F 1 i ; i = 1; 3 which are given by
Then, player 1's winning probability against player 3 in the …rst stage (node F1 in Figure 2 ) is given by
and the expected total e¤ort in the …rst stage (node F1 in Figure 2 ) is given by
If, on the other hand, v > 2 (node F2 in Figure 2 ), by (50), (56), (59), (64) and (65), there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium in which players 1 and 3 randomize on the interval [0; 
Then, player 1's winning probability against player 3 in the …rst stage (node F2 in Figure 2 ) is given by
2 + 6v 1
and the expected total e¤ort in the …rst stage (node F2 in Figure 2 ) is given by
of the round-robin tournament
We now analyze the case where the weak players (players 1 and 2) are matched in the last stage. The possible paths of this tournament are described by Figure 3 .
Stage 3 (player 1 vs. player 2)
As previously, we have the following three scenarios:
1) Assume …rst that player 1 won the game in the …rst stage and player 2 won the game in the second stage (node A in Figure 3 ). Therefore, each player won once before the last stage, implying that the winner of the third stage wins the entire contest. In that case, the winner's payo¤ would be 1 and the loser's payo¤ would be zero. Thus, there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium in which players 1 and 2 randomize on the interval [0; 1] according to their e¤ort cumulative distribution functions F 3 i ; i = 1; 2 which are given by
Then, player 1's winning probability against player 2 in the third stage (node A in Figure 3 ) is given by
and the expected total e¤ort in the third stage (node A in Figure 3 ) is given by
2) Assume now that player 1 won in the …rst stage and player 2 lost in the second stage (node B in Figure   3 ). Thus, if player 1 also wins in the third stage he wins the tournament. Then, his payo¤ is 1, whereas player 2's payo¤ is zero. But, if player 2 wins in this stage, then every player wins once and a draw will determine the winner of the tournament. In that case, players 1 and 2's payo¤ is equal to 
Then, player 1's winning probability against player 2 in the third stage (node B in Figure 3 ) is given by
and the expected total e¤ort in the third stage (node B in Figure 3 ) is given by
3) Assume now that player 1 lost the game in the …rst stage and player 2 won in the second stage (node C in Figure 3 ). Thus, if player 2 wins in the third stage he wins the entire tournament. Then, his payo¤ is 1, whereas player 1's payo¤ is zero. But, if player 1 wins in this stage, then every player wins once and a draw will determine the winner of the tournament. In that case, players 1 and 2's payo¤ is equal to are given by
Then, player 1's winning probability against player 2 in the third stage (node C in Figure 3 ) is given by
and the expected total e¤ort in the third stage (node C in Figure 3 ) is given by
Stage 2 (player 2 vs. player 3)
1) Assume that player 3 lost in the …rst stage (node D in Figure 3) . Then, by (73), even if player 2 wins in the second stage, his expected payo¤ in the next stage is zero. Then, player 2's winning probability against player 3 in the second stage (node D in Figure 3 ) is given by
and the expected total e¤ort in the second stage (node D in Figure 3 ) is given by
2) However, if player 3 won in the …rst stage (node E in Figure 3 
Then, player 2's winning probability against player 3 in the second stage (node E in Figure 3 ) is given by
and the expected total e¤ort in the second stage (node E in Figure 3 ) is given by 
Then, player 1's winning probability against player 3 in the …rst stage (node F1 in Figure 3 ) is given by
and the expected total e¤ort in the …rst stage (node F1 in Figure 3 ) is given by
Finally, if v > 1:45 (node F2 in Figure 3 ), by (76), (79), (82), (84) and (85), there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium in which players 1 and 3 randomize on the interval [0; 
Then, player 1's winning probability against player 3 in the …rst stage (node F2 in Figure 3 ) is given by
and the expected total e¤ort in the …rst stage (node F2 in Figure 3 ) is given by .
We can see that when the asymmetry is weak, i.e., 1 < v 1:09, the dominant player (player 3) has an expected payo¤ of zero which is smaller than the expected payo¤s of the other players, while when the asymmetry is strong, i.e., v > 2, the dominant player's expected payo¤ is higher than the other players since .
We can see that when 1 < v 2 the dominant player's expected payo¤ is higher than the other players since 8v Thus, independent of whether asymmetry is weak or strong, the expected payo¤ of the dominant player is always higher than the expected payo¤s of the weak players. We can see that when 1 < v 1:33 since 12v + 16 > 0, the dominant player does not have the highest expected payo¤. On the other hand, when v > 1:33, since 12v + 16 < 0 and 3v 4 > 0; the dominant player has the highest expected payo¤. Thus, if the asymmetry between the players is relatively low, the expected payo¤ of the dominant player is lower than the expected payo¤s of the weak players. Q.E.D.
The dominant player' s winning probability
In the following we calculate the dominant player's probability of winning in the round-robin tournaments for all the three possible allocations of players. If 1:267 < v 1:596, by (6) , (9), (15), (21), (30) 
Total e¤ort
Below, we analyze the expected total e¤ort in the round-robin tournament for the three possible allocations of players. If 1:09 < v 1:267, by (7), (10), (16), (21), (22), (27), (28), (36) And if v > 2, by (7), (13), (16), (24), (25), (30), (31), (45) and (46) 
